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Abstract. A model of reputation is presented in which agents share and
aggregate their opinions, and observe the way in which their opinions
eﬀect the opinions of others. A method is proposed that supports the
deliberative process of combining opinions into a group’s reputation. The
reliability of agents as opinion givers are measured in terms of the extent
to which their opinions diﬀer from that of the group reputation. These
reliability measures are used to form an a priori reputation estimate
given the individual opinions of a set of independent agents.
1 Introduction
This paper describes a reputation model that is inspired by information theory
and that is based on the information-based agency explained elsewhere [1]. Rep-
utation is the opinion (more technically, a social evaluation) of a group about
something [2]. So a group’s reputation about a thing will be related in some way
to the opinions that the individual group members hold towards that thing [3].
An opinion is an assessment, judgement or evaluation of something, and are rep-
resented in this paper as probability distributions on a suitable ontology called
the evaluation space E.
An opinion is an evaluation of an aspect of a thing [4]. An aspect is the “point
of view” that an agent has when forming his opinion. An opinion is evaluated
in context. The context is the set of all things that the thing is being, explicitly
or implicitly, evaluated with or against. The set of valuations of all things in the
context calibrates the valuation space [5]. For example, “this is the best paper in
the conference”. The context can be vague: “of all the presents you could have
given me, this is the best”. If agents are to discuss opinions then they must have
some understanding of each other’s context.
Summarising the above, an opinion is an agent’s evaluation of a particular
aspect of a thing in context [6]. A representation of an opinion will contain: the
thing, its aspect, its context, and a distribution on E representing the evaluation
of the thing.
In this paper we explore the case of opinions being formed through a social
evaluation process. Each agent in a group of agents ﬁrst forms an individual
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opinion on some thing. Second these individual opinions are shared with rest
of the group. A group discussion follows as a result of which each agent states
a revised opinion. Following that there is another discussion during which the
group attempts to formulate a shared reputation for the thing. The model that
we describe is based on three observations only for each participating agent:
their initial individual opinion, their revised opinion, and the group’s reputation
if one is agreed upon. This social evaluation process was suggested by a process
used to evaluate submissions to conferences.
2 The Multiagent System
We assume that a multiagent system {α, β1, . . . , βo, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}, contains an
agent α that interacts with negotiating agents, βi, information providing agents,
θj , and an institutional agent, ξ, that represents the institution where we assume
the interactions happen [7]. Institutions give a normative context to interactions
that simplify matters (e.g an agent can’t make an oﬀer, have it accepted, and
then renege on it). The institutional agent ξ may form opinions on the actors
and activities in the institution and may publish reputation estimates on behalf
of the institution. The agent ξ also fulﬁls a vital role to compensate for any
lack of sensory ability in the other agents by promptly and accurately reporting
observations as events occur; for an example, without such reporting an agent
may have no way of knowing whether it is a ﬁne day or not. When we consider
the system from the point of view of a particular agent we will use agent α, and
that is α’s only signiﬁcance.
Our agents are information-based [8], everything in their world is uncertain.
To deal with this uncertainty, the world model, Mt, consists of random vari-
ables each representing a point of interest in the world. Distributions are then
derived for these variables on the basis of information received. Additionally,
information-based agents [8] are endowed with machinery for valuing the infor-
mation that they have, and that they receive. They were inspired by the obser-
vation that “everything an agent says gives away information”. They model how
much they know about other agents, and how much they believe other agents
know about them. By classifying private information into functional classes, and
by drawing on the structure of the ontology, they develop a map of the ‘intimacy’
[9] of their relationships with other agents.
3 Forming Opinions
This section describes how an information-based agent forms opinions [10]. Sec-
tion 4 will describe how the opinions of the agents in a group may be distilled
into a reputation.
An opinion is a valuation by an agent of an aspect of a thing taken in context.
Formally, Oi(z, a, C) represents the result of the valuation by agent βi of aspect
a of thing z in context C. For example, the valuation by agent “Carles” of the
“scientiﬁc quality” aspect of the thing “John’s paper” in the context of “the
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AAMAS conference submissions”. The context C is often subjectively chosen by
the agent, and is not part of the opinion(·) primitive, although context may be
the subject of associated argumentation.
As noted above, to preserve consistency and generality we assume that all
opinions are expressed as probability distributions over some suitable E. If an
agent expresses an opinion as P(X = ei) we treat this as the distribution with
minimum relative entropy with respect to the prior subject to the constraint
P(X = ei) — in case there is no known prior we use the maximum entropy,
uniform distribution. For example, if E = (ﬁne, cloudy,wet, storm) then the
opinion “I am 70% certain that tomorrow will be ﬁne” will be represented as
(0.7, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) for a uniform prior.
The distributions in an agent’s world model Mt represent the agent’s opin-
ions about the value of the corresponding random variable over some valuation
space. Opinions may be derived from opinions. For example, to form an opin-
ion on “tomorrow’s suitability for a picnic” and agent may introduce random
variables for: tomorrow’s mid-day temperature, tomorrow’s mid-day cloud cover,
and tomorrow’s mid-day wind strength, construct distributions for them using
on-the-ﬂy weather forecast information, and then derive an opinion about the
picnic somehow from these three distributions.
In Section 3.1 we describe how the distributions in the world model are up-
dated as real-time information becomes available; in that section we also esti-
mate the reliability of each information source by subsequently validating the
information received from it.
3.1 Updating Opinions with Real-Time Information
In the absence of in-coming messages the distributions in Mt should gradually
decay towards some zero-information state. In many cases there is background
knowledge about the world — for example, a distribution of the daily maximum
temperature in Barcelona in May — such a distribution is called a decay-limit
distribution. If the background knowledge is incomplete then one possibility is
to assume that the decay limit distribution has maximum entropy whilst being
consistent with the available data. Given a distribution, P(Xi), and a decay limit
distribution D(Xi), P(Xi) decays by:
P
t+1(Xi) = Δi(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (1)
where Δi is the decay function for the Xi with limt→∞ Pt(Xi) = D(Xi). For
example, Δi could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1 − νi)× D(Xi) + νi × Pt(Xi), where
νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either the decay function or
the decay limit distribution could also be a function of time: Δti and D
t(Xi).
The following procedure updates Mt. Suppose that α receives a message μ
from agent β at time t.1 Suppose that this message states that something is so
1 This message is not necessarily a message from the language in section 2. We refer
with μ to any inform message with propositional content that can be processed by
the agent.
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with probability v, and suppose that α attaches an epistemic belief Rt(α, β, μ)
to μ — this probability reﬂects α’s level of personal caution. Each of α’s active
plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt together with
associated update functions, Js(·), such that JXis (μ) is a set of linear constraints
on the posterior distribution for Xi. Denote the prior distribution Pt(Xi) by p,
and let p(μ) be the distribution with minimum relative entropy2 with respect to
p: p(μ) = argminr
∑
j rj log
rj
pj
that satisﬁes the constraints JXis (μ). Then let
q(μ) be the distribution:
q(μ) = Rt(α, β, μ) × p(μ) + (1− Rt(α, β, μ)) × p (2)
and then let:
P
t(Xi(μ)) =
{
q(μ) if q(μ) is more interesting than p
p otherwise
(3)
A general measure of whether q(μ) is more interesting than p is: K(q(μ)‖D(Xi)) >
K(p‖D(Xi)), where K(x‖y) =
∑
j xj ln
xj
yj
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between two probability distributions x and y.
Finally merging Eqn. 3 and Eqn. 1 we obtain the method for updating a
distribution Xi on receipt of a message μ:
P
t+1(Xi) = Δi(D(Xi),Pt(Xi(μ))) (4)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two probabilities: ﬁrst, the
probability v in the message μ, and second the belief Rt(α, β, μ) that α attached
to μ.
Reliability of the Information Source. An empirical estimate of Rt(α, β, μ)
may be obtained by measuring the ‘diﬀerence’ between commitment and veri-
ﬁcation [13]. Suppose that μ is received from agent β at time u and is veriﬁed
by ξ as μ′ at some later time t.3 Denote the prior Pu(Xi) by p. Let p(μ) be
the posterior minimum relative entropy distribution subject to the constraints
JXis (μ), and let p(μ′) be that distribution subject to J
Xi
s (μ
′). We now estimate
what Ru(α, β, μ) should have been in the light of knowing now, at time t, that
μ should have been μ′.
The idea of Eqn. 2, is that Rt(α, β, μ) should be such that, on average across
Mt, q(μ) will predict p(μ′) — no matter whether or not μ was used to update
2 Given a probability distribution q, the minimum relative entropy distribution
p = (p1, . . . , pI) subject to a set of J linear constraints g = {gj(p) = aj ·
p − cj = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J (that must include the constraint
∑
i
pi − 1 = 0) is:
p = argminr
∑
j
rj log
rj
qj
. This may be calculated by introducing Lagrange multi-
pliers λ: L(p,λ) =
∑
j
pj log
pj
qj
+λ·g. Minimising L, { ∂L
∂λj
= gj(p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J
is the set of given constraints g, and a solution to ∂L
∂pi
= 0, i = 1, . . . , I leads eventu-
ally to p. Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is convenient
when the data is sparse [11] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [12].
3 This could be later communicated as inform(γ, α, experience(γ, β, μ, μ′), t).
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the distribution for Xi, as determined by the condition in Eqn. 3 at time u. The
observed reliability for μ and distribution Xi, RtXi(α, β, μ)|μ′, on the basis of the
veriﬁcation of μ with μ′, is the value of k that minimises the Kullback-Leibler
divergence:
R
t
Xi(α, β, μ)|μ′ = argmink K(k · p(μ) + (1− k) · p ‖ p(μ′))
The predicted information in the enactment of μ with respect to Xi is:
I
t
Xi(α, β, μ) = H
t(Xi)−Ht(Xi(μ)) (5)
that is the reduction in uncertainty in Xi where H(·) is Shannon entropy. Eqn. 5
takes account of the value of Rt(α, β, μ).
If X(μ) is the set of distributions that μ aﬀects, then the observed reliability
of β on the basis of the veriﬁcation of μ with μ′ is:
R
t(α, β, μ)|μ′ = 1|X(μ)|
∑
i
R
t
Xi(α, β, μ)|μ′ (6)
If X(μ) are independent the predicted information in μ is:
I
t(α, β, μ) =
∑
Xi∈X(μ)
I
t
Xi(α, β, μ) (7)
Suppose α sends message μ to β where μ is α’s private information, then assum-
ing that β’s reasoning apparatus mirrors α’s, α can estimate It(β, α, μ).
For each formula ϕ at time t when μ has been veriﬁed with μ′, the observed
reliability that α has for agent β in ϕ is:
R
t+1(α, β, ϕ) = (1− ν)× Rt(α, β, ϕ) + ν × Rt(α, β, μ)|μ′ × Sim(ϕ, μ)
where Sim measures the semantic distance between two sections of the ontology,
and ν is the learning rate. Over time, α notes the context of the various μ
received from β, and over the various contexts calculates the relative frequency,
P
t(μ). This leads to an overall expectation of the reliability that agent α has for
agent β:
R
t(α, β) =
∑
μ
P
t(μ)× Rt(α, β, μ)
3.2 Verifiable Opinions
An opinion is verifiable if within a “reasonable amount of time” it ceases to be an
opinion and becomes an observable fact; for example, the opinion “tomorrow’s
maximum temperature will be over 30◦” is veriﬁable, whereas the opinion “the
Earth will exist in 100,000 years time” is not veriﬁable in any practical sense,
and “Brahms’ symphonies are ghastly” will never be veriﬁable.
The articulation by β of a veriﬁable opinion carries with it the intrinsic com-
mitment that it will in due time become an observable true fact. α will be
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interested in any variation between β’s commitment, ϕ, and what is actually
observed (as advised by the institution agent ξ), as the fact, ϕ′. We denote the
relationship between opinion and fact, Pt(Observe(ϕ′)|Commit(ϕ)) simply as
P
t(ϕ′|ϕ) ∈ Mt.
In the absence of in-coming messages the conditional probabilities, Pt(ϕ′|ϕ),
should tend to ignorance as represented by the decay limit distribution and
Eqn. 1. We now show how Eqn. 4 may be used to revise Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) as observations
are made. Let the set of possible factual outcomes be Φ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕm}
with prior distribution p = Pt(ϕ′|ϕ). Suppose that message μ is received from ξ
that veriﬁes or refutes a previously stated veriﬁable opinion expressed by β, we
estimate the posterior p(μ) = (p(μ)i)mi=1 = P
t+1(ϕ′|ϕ).
First, if μ = (ϕk, ϕ) is observed then α may use this observation to estimate
p(ϕk)k as some value d at time t + 1. We estimate the distribution p(ϕk) by
applying the principle of minimum relative entropy as in Eqn. 4 with prior p, and
the posterior p(ϕk) = (p(ϕk)j)
m
j=1 satisfying the single constraint: J
(ϕ′|ϕ)(ϕk) =
{p(ϕk)k = d}.
Second, we consider the eﬀect that the veriﬁcation φ′ of another simple, veri-
ﬁable opinion φ of β has on p. This is achieved by appealing to the structure of
the ontology using a semantic distance function Sim(·). Given the observation
μ = (φ′, φ), deﬁne the vector t by:
ti = Pt(ϕi|ϕ) + (1− | Sim(φ′, φ)− Sim(ϕi, ϕ) |) · Sim(ϕ′, φ)
for i = 1, . . . ,m. t is not a probability distribution. The multiplying factor
Sim(ϕ′, φ) limits the variation of probability to those formulae whose ontological
context is not too far away from the observation. The posterior p(φ′,φ) is deﬁned
to be the normalisation of t.
In this section we have shown how an information-based agent models the
accuracy of an agent’s opinions when they are veriﬁable. The model produced is
predictive in the sense that when an opinion is stated it gives a distribution of
expectation over the space of factual outcomes.
3.3 Unverifiable Opinions
If an opinion can not be veriﬁed then one way in which it may be evaluated is
to compare it with the corresponding individual opinions, or group reputation,
of a group of agents. The focus of this paper is on reputation; that is, a social
evaluation conducted by a group. We deal with unveriﬁable opinions using a
social evaluation framework that is abstracted from any particular case. The
idea is that a group G of n agents independently form a prior opinion, Oi on the
same thing. Each agent has a prior conﬁdence value, ci, that estimates how close
its prior opinion, Oi, is expected to be to the reputation, or common opinion, of
the group, RG — precisely ci measures how eﬀective the agent is at inﬂuencing
the opinions of other agents, it does not measure how good its opinion is in
any absolute sense as the opinion is assumed to be unveriﬁable. The agents
then make their prior opinions public to the other agents and an argumentative
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Fig. 1. The social evaluation framework in which a group G of n agents β1,. . . ,βn
table their private opinions O1, . . . , On, have an open, argumentative discussion Δ (see
Section 3.3), and then revise their opinions O1|Δ, . . . , On|Δ. This is followed by another
argumentative discussion Γ (see Section 4) during which the agents consider whether
revised opinions can be distilled into a common reputation RG. The symbols ci and cG
are conﬁdence values as explained below.
discussion, Δ, takes place during which the agents may choose to revise their
opinions, Oi|Δ. When the revised opinions are published a second argumentative
discussion, Γ , takes place during which the agents attempt to distil their opinions
into a group reputation, RG. The conﬁdence estimates, ci are then revised by
noting the diﬀerences between Oi, Oi|Δ and RG, to give posterior values, ci|Δ.
The processes in Figure 1 are summarised as:
Δ : f({(Oi, ci}) = {Oi|Δ}
Γ : g({(Oi|Δ, ci}) = (RG, dG)
{Δ,Γ} : h({(Oi, ci, Oi|Δ}, RG) = {ci|Δ}
The function f(·) is the product of the discussion Δ — we simply observe the
outcome. Function g(·) is described in Section 4, and h(·) in Section 5.
4 Combining Opinions and Forming Reputation
A reputation is a social evaluation by a group. When the group is a set of
autonomous agents the only sense in which an opinion can exist is as a common
opinion throughout the group. The objective of the argumentative process Γ in
Figure 1 is to determine a common view if one exists. The following procedure
ﬁrst determines whether a common view exists, and second it oﬀers three views
of what that common view could be. The three diﬀerent views vary with diﬀering
degrees of statistical dependence between the agents.
The process of distilling opinions into a reputation can not simply be com-
puted. For example, consider two agents who are reviewing the same confer-
ence paper and are in total agreement about the result “a ‘strong accept’ with
conﬁdence 0.8” where the reliability of each agent is 90%. What should their
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combined opinion, or in this case ‘paper reputation’, be? As their individual re-
liability is 90% perhaps the common view is “a ‘strong accept’ with conﬁdence
0.72”. Alternatively because they both agree, and may have quite diﬀerent rea-
sons supporting their views, perhaps the common view should be “a ‘strong
accept’ with some conﬁdence greater than 0.8”.
The work described in the remainder of this section and in Section 5 is ex-
pressed in terms of two agents; it extends naturally to n agents. The procedure
is based on three methods that are detailed below.
Dependent Method. To form a combined opinion of two opinions, X1 and X2,
construct the joint distribution W = (X1, X2, Z) and impose the constraints:
(
∑
i
P(W = wi) | Xk = xj
)
= P(Xk = xj), k = 1, 2
(
∑
i
P(W = wi) | Xk = Z
)
= ck, k = 1, 2
let W be the distribution of maximum entropy that satisﬁes these constraints.
Then the combined opinion Dep(X1, X2) is P(Z = z). If the data is inconsistent
then the value is undeﬁned — this is a test of whether the data is consistent.
If the data is inconsistent then this indicates that there is no shared opinion.
Being based on a maximum entropy calculation the posterior is a conservative
combination of the given opinions — it is “maximally noncommittal” to that
which is not known. To calculate this dependent, combined opinion when the
prior is known, calculate the minimum relative entropy distribution with respect
to that prior using the same constraints as described.
Υ Method. Let’s deﬁne P(α, d) as the probability that an opinion Oα expressed
by α (i.e, a probability distribution) is at distance d of the true distribution
(or at distance d of a group opinion). That is, the probability that a certain
distribution Q is the right one is deﬁned as P (Q is right) = P(α,DIST (Oα, Q))
for an appropriate distance measure DIST .4 These distributions can be obtained
by datamining past group opinion formation processes.
Given a group G, we look for the group opinion, RG such that the certainty
on that group opinion being the right one is maximised. That is,
RG = max
Q
Υ ({P(α,DIST(Oα, Q))}α∈G)
Where Υ is the uninorm operator [15]. In case there are several such group
opinions we prefer the one with maximum entropy. And then,
dG = Υ ({P(α,DIST(Oα, RG))}α∈G)
For the values in Table 1, we discreetise the P(α, d) in the intervals between the
points in the following list: [0, 0.035, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1].
4 Kullback-Leibler divergence, or the earth movers distance [14] could be used.
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Independent Method. Given a prior distribution P(W = xj), a pair of opinions,
P(Xi = xj) i = 1, 2, with their respective certainties ci, assuming that the
agents’ opinions are statistically independent, let wi,j = ci × P(Xi = xj), i =
1, 2, and let vj =
∏
i
wi,j∏
i
wi,j+
∏
i
(1−wi,j) then the combined opinion Ind(X1, X2) is:
vj + (1−
∑
k vk)×P(W = xj), with strength
∑
k vk. This method assumes that
the priors are independent (unlikely in practice) and has the property that the
probabilities in two similar distributions are ampliﬁed.
The overall procedure plays the role of a mediator [16]. If the ‘Dependent
Method’ does not return a value then the data is inconsistent, and the agents
should either have further discussion or “agree to disagree”. Otherwise calculate
the three values Dep(·), Υ (·) and Ind(·). Propose Υ (·) to the agents, and if
they accept it then that is their common opinion. Otherwise propose that their
common opinion lies somewhere between Dep(·) and Ind(·) and leave it to them
to determine it.
Table 1 contains some sample values for the three methods. In Case 3 the
two opinions are identical with maximal value of 0.8 and strengths of 0.8 and
0.9. The Dep(X1, X2) method is conservative and gives 0.77 because of the
strength values. The Υ (X1, X2) method balances the strength uncertainty with
the fact that their are two shared views to give 0.8. The Ind(X1, X2) method
is bold and gives 0.85 because two agents share the same view; the boldness
of the Ind(X1, X2) method is balanced by its comparatively low strength
values.
Table 1. Three cases of sample values for the three methods for combining opin-
ions. In each case the opinions are X1 and X2 and the strength of the distribu-
tions is denoted by “Str”. The right hand column contains the discreetised P(α, d)
values described in the ‘Υ Method’. All calculations were performed with a uniform
prior.
#1 X1 0.1000 0.5000 0.2000 0.1000 0.1000 Str = 0.9 P = 〈0.9, 0.05, 0.03, 0.01, 0.01〉
X2 0.0500 0.8000 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 Str = 0.7 P = 〈0.7, 0.2, 0.05, 0.03, 0.02〉
Dep 0.0919 0.5590 0.1653 0.0919 0.0919 cG ≈ 1
Υ 0.0700 0.7000 0.1700 0.0700 0.0700 cG = 0.95
Ind 0.0978 0.6044 0.1022 0.0978 0.0978 cG = 0.53
#2 X1 0.1000 0.6000 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 Str = 0.8 P = 〈0.8, 0.1, 0.04, 0.01, 0.01〉
X2 0.0500 0.8000 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 Str = 0.9 P = 〈0.9, 0.06, 0.03, 0.01, 0.01〉
Dep 0.0683 0.7266 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 cG ≈ 1
Υ 0.08 0.63 0.08 0.08 0.08 cG = 0.97
Ind 0.0601 0.7596 0.0601 0.0601 0.0601 cG = 0.72
#3 X1 0.0500 0.8000 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 Str = 0.8 P = 〈0.8, 0.1, 0.04, 0.01, 0.01〉
X2 0.0500 0.8000 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 Str = 0.9 P = 〈0.9, 0.06, 0.03, 0.01, 0.01〉
Dep 0.0573 0.7707 0.0573 0.0573 0.0573 cG ≈ 1
Υ 0.05 0.8 0.05 0.05 0.05 cG = 0.97
Ind 0.0363 0.8548 0.0363 0.0363 0.0363 cG = 0.83
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5 Reputation of the Agents
In the previous section we described how a mediator could assist agents to agree
on a common opinion, or reputation, of some thing being evaluated [17]. Addi-
tionally, the institution ξ builds a view of the reputation of the individual agents
who perform the evaluations by observing the process illustrated in Figure 1.
In particular, ξ observes the development of the ci values (described below),
the distances between initial opinion Oi and considered opinion Oi|Δ, and the
distances between both opinions and the group reputation RG when it exists.
Given two opinions X1 and X2 the strength of X1 on X2 is deﬁned as: P(X1 =
X2). If X1 and X2 are both deﬁned over the same valuation space E = {ei}ni=1
then: P(X1 = X2) =
∑
i P (W = wi) | X1 = X2, where W = (X1, X2) is
the joint distribution. That is, we sum along the diagonal of the joint dis-
tribution. We estimate the diagonal wi values using the dependent estimate:
P(X1 = ei) ∧ P(X1 = ei) = minj P(Xj = ei), and hence: Str(X1, X2) = P(X1 =
X2) =
∑
i minj P(Xj = ei). A measure of the distance between X1 and X2 is
then: Dist(X1, X2) = 1 − Str(X1, X2). This deﬁnition of strength is consistent
with the ‘Dependent Method’ in Section 4 that is the basis of the reputation
mediation procedure. Other deﬁnitions include the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
Dist(X1, X2) = K(X1||X2), and the earth movers distance [14].
Each time a reputation RG is formed, the ci values are updated using: ci|Δ =
μ×Dist(Oi, RG)+ (1−μ)× ci, where μ is the learning rate. These ci values are
the product of successive social evaluation processes, and so they are reputation
estimates.
The measures described above do not take the structure of the evaluation
space E into account. Four additional measures are:
A generic distance measure. Dist(X,Y ) = K(X ′||Y ′) where (X ′, Y ′) is a permu-
tation of (X,Y ) the satisﬁes X ′ < Y ′, and the order is deﬁned by: RG < Oi|Δ <
Oi. I.e. the earliest occurring distribution “goes in the second argument”. This
complication with ordering is necessary because K is not symmetric; it attempts
to exploit the sense of relative entropy. An alternative is to use the symmetric
form as it was originally proposed: 12 (K(X,Y ) + K(Y,X))
A distance measure when the prior, Z, is known. This builds on the generic
measure, and captures the idea that the distance between a pair of unexpected
distributions is greater than the diﬀerence between a pair of similar, expected
distributions. We measure of how expected X is by: K(X,Z), and normalise it
by: maxIK(I, Z) to get: e(X) =
K(X,Z)
maxIK(I,Z)
. Then this measure is the arithmetic
product of the previous generic measure with: e(X)+e(Y )2 .
A semantic distance measure. Suppose there is a diﬀerence measure Diﬀ(·, ·) de-
ﬁned between concepts in the ontology. Then the distance between two opinions
X and Y over valuation space E (represented as distributions pi and qi respec-
tively) is: Dist(X,Y ) =
∑
ij pi × qj × Diﬀ(ei, ej) where ei are the categories in
E.
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A distance measure when E is ordered and the prior is known. If the valuation
space E has a natural order, and if there is a known prior then deﬁne Diﬀ(ei, ej)
to be the proportion of the population that is expected to lie between ei and ej .
Then deﬁne Dist(X,Y ) =
∑
ij pi × qj × Diﬀ(ei, ej). For example, in conference
reviewing, if the expectation is that 40% of reviews are ‘weak accept’ and 20%
are ‘accept’ then Diﬀ(‘weak accept’, ‘accept’)= 402 +
20
2 ; i.e. taking the mid points
of the intervals.
The measures described for Dist(X,Y ) are now used to enable ξ to attribute
various reputations to agents. These reputation measures all assume that the
agents have been involved in a number of successive social evaluation rounds.
Inexorable. If agent βi is such that: Dist(Oi, Oi|Δ)  Dist(Oi, Oj |Δ), ∀j = i
consistently holds then βi is inexorable.
Predetermination. If: Dist(Oi, RG)  Dist(Oj , RG), ∀j = i consistently, then
βi is a good ‘predeterminer ’. Such an agent will have a high ci value.
Persuasiveness. If βi is such that: Dist(Oi, Oj |Δ)  Dist(Oj , Oj |Δ), ∀j = i
consistently then βi is persuasive.
Compliance. If βi is such that: Oi|Δ ≈ argminX
∑
j =i Dist(Oj |Δ,X), then βi
is compliant.
Dogmatic. If βi is such that: Oi = Oi|Δ consistently then βi is dogmatic. A
dogmatic agent is highly inexorable.
Adherence. If βi is such that Oi|Δ = Oj where j = argmaxk,k =i ck consis-
tently then βi is adherent (in this round adherent to agent βj).
6 Discussion
Reputation measures are becoming a cornerstone of many applications over the
web. This is the case in recommender systems or in trading mediation sites. In
these applications there is a need to assess, for instance, how much should we
trust the recommendation coming from an unknown source, or how reliable a
trading partner is. This paper has proposed a number of methods to ground the
social building of reputation measures. The methods are based on information
theory and permit to combine opinions when there is a high level of independence
in the formation of the individual opinions. The method permits the computa-
tion of reputation values as aggregation of individual opinions, and also detects
when agreement is not feasible. This impossibility may be used to trigger fur-
ther discussions among the members of the group or to introduce changes in the
composition of the group to permit agreements.
The use of social network analysis measures permits to deﬁne heuristics on
how to combine opinions when there is no complete independence in the opin-
ions expressed by the agents. There are a number of diﬀerent relationships that
may be used to guess dependency. For instance, in the context of scientiﬁc pub-
lications, co-authorship or aﬃliation, meaning that authors have written papers
together or belong to the same laboratory may indicate a signiﬁcant exchange
of information between them and therefore a certain level of dependency. The
aggregation of values by function h can then use these measures to diminish the
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joint inﬂuence of dependent opinions into the reputation. This is to be explored
in future extensions of the information based reputation model.
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